THE CURSE OF THE SAVINGS CLAUSE IN THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
Introduction: What are Savings Clauses?
Savings clauses are provisions inserted into some of the independent constitutions, in order to preserve existing law, or pre-independence common law.1 In almost all Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions there is a savings clause, or, what may also be termed as, a saving law clause.2 At the present time, only the constitution of Belize is free from any kind of savings clause.3 However, it should be noted, that at the time of independence, the constitution of Belize also included a savings clause.4 It is only because of an expiration date placed on the savings clause, that the constitution of Belize is free of a savings clause today.5
There are two types of savings clauses in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional law: general savings clauses and special savings clauses. The general savings clause declares to carry forward all the laws of the old regime. 6 For example, the constitution of Trinidad and Tobago includes a general savings clause which saves all “existing law” from challenge, including, laws that are incompatible with fundamental rights guarantees.7 The special savings clause, the second type of savings clause, protects specific penalties or punishments that were in existence at independence from challenge.8 This is demonstrated in the constitution of Jamaica. It has a special savings clause protecting preexisting penalties from review under the clause prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading punishment. 9 Jamaica also has a general clause, insulating from fundamental rights challenge those laws that were in force in prior to the adoption of the constitution.10
The debate of savings clauses centers on the question of whether these new constitutions should be interpreted as having more force than existing common law, thus having the power to go beyond common law legal principles that are expressly preserved.11 The presumption behind including savings clauses in the Caribbean constitutions was that the common law present at the time of independence was fully compatible with the fundamental rights protections in the new constitutions.12 The framers of Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions were intent on preserving much of the colonial legal system.13
When the drafters were drafting the new Caribbean constitutions, they were faced with the challenge of derogating common law rights in certain circumstances. It was feared that exclusive reliance on the new, written bill of rights regimes to define the scope of the rights might unduly interfere with what was understood at the time to be lawful executive practice.14“The very existence of such clauses and their interpretation is perhaps evidence of the fear of self-determination inherent in Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems.” 15 Thus, savings clauses were designed to ensure continuity from the colonial to the post independent legal era. What has resulted is an entirely different matter. Initially created as a shortcut method of amalgamating common law rights and constitutional protections, savings clauses have often done so at the expense of human rights provisions. “These clauses place[d] a “no go” sign over the fundamental rights grants of the charters by grandfathering pre-existing law into constitutional regime.”16
Although the constitutions and charters that were produced included generous individual rights provisions; because of savings clauses, these “constitutions are both brittle and static.” 17 As such, they are found inadequate in protecting fundamental rights.18 “Strictly applied the savings clause produces absurd results, trapping Britain’s former colonies in a time warp, forever binding them to laws rejected as antiquated by Britain itself.” 19 Specifically speaking, the time warp is evidenced by the mandatory nature of the death penalty sentence. Pre-independence constitutions had expressly preserved the death penalty as it was practiced prior to independence; which in its pre-independence form clearly had no judicial consideration of mitigating factors.20 Since the constitutions of the Commonwealth Caribbean states were first adopted in the 1960s, courts have been perplexed by the savings clauses included within these instruments.21 These clauses have presented vexing problems of construction as appellate tribunals have attempted to reconcile international human rights norms.22
Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions are viewed as merely codifying existing rights and not creating new ones.23 The focus of this paper is to delve further into the dilemma of savings clauses, as well as, how the savings clause has managed to undermine the force of written constitutions. Additionally, this paper will discuss how the problem of savings clauses has been addressed. Lastly, this paper will discuss how the Commonwealth Caribbean countries may move forward when faced with such clauses – via the progressive role of the Caribbean Court of Justice.
The Theoretical Dilemma of Savings Clauses
Savings clauses create a dilemma between the written constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and the opposing forces of common law which have been expressly saved. This dilemma is evident in the constitutions of the Commonwealth Caribbean. “By privileging preexisting laws and shielding them from scrutiny, two of the central features of constitutionalism (constitutional supremacy and judicial review) are severely undermined.”24 As a result, Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions have often been interpreted as merely codifying existing common law instead of creating new legal rights.
The dilemma of the savings clauses comes in two main forms. First, there is difficulty in determining how to interpret and apply the savings clauses because they are not uniform clauses among Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions. Secondly, the Privy Counsel has yet to determine a consistent way to apply the doctrine while at the same time trying to balance constitutional guarantees.
Savings clauses present a range of interpretive challenges, some theoretical others practical. The fundamental premise of the savings clause-- that the old regime should be preserved --can be seen to have infected areas of constitutional interpretation. The problem of interpretation is a result of the non uniformity of the clauses themselves. This is the first form of the savings clause dilemma.
Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions are not uniform in their application of the savings clause.25 Accordingly, there are complex practical problems of interpretation. For example, some constitutions have no savings clause at all, while others have more than one.26 Some Caribbean constitutions provide that existing laws should be constructed to bring them into conformity with the constitution; others Caribbean constitutions are silent on the question of how to construe conflicting, existing laws. 27 The constitutional text does not always reveal whether existing statutory law alone is continued or whether common law is also saved. 28 The savings clause in the Barbados and Guyana constitutions applies only to written law. 29 The savings clause in the Constitution of Belize was limited to five years after independence, and hence, it has expired.30
In view of this, when comparing various Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions, constitutional readings of the same rights-granting language can vary enormously depending on the mechanics of the particular savings clause, specifically whether the clause is general or special and whether there is textual guidance respecting the interpretation of the clause. 31
The appellate courts have addressed the general savings clause, which carries over all laws from the pre-constitution regime, and the special savings clause, which insulates particular laws or penalties from constitutional scrutiny. 32 Some of the constitutions deploy both the general and the special savings clause, while others use one or the other and one state's charter has no savings clause at all. 33 These variations make it challenging to develop uniform constitutional rules. 34 The Privy Council has recently issued seven judgments on the legality of the mandatory death penalty.35 Because of the operation of the savings clauses, the mandatory death penalty was struck down in Belize, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Dominica, and Jamaica but ruled constitutional in Barbados and in Trinidad and Tobago, in spite of the fact that all of the cases involved similar mandatory sentencing statutes and similar fundamental rights language.36
The second form of the savings clause dilemma, of constitutional guarantees versus the opposing forces of common law, is portrayed by the actions of the Privy Counsel. The Privy Counsel has tacked to and fro in interpreting the savings clauses. They have left a confusing body of law in their path that ultimately undermines the fundamental integrity of constitutionalism.37 In St. Lucia, the Privy Counsel responded by construing the savings clause in a strict and narrow interpretation rather than a broad construction. 38 St. Lucia contains a partial savings clause ostensibly to protect it pre-independence forms of punishment from constitutional challenge. This clause reads: “Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with the Constitution’s prohibition on inhuman treatment to the extent that the law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful prior to independence.”39 A strict and narrow construction thereby enabled the Privy Counsel to rule that the St. Lucia savings clause could not be regarded as authority for the proposition that the mandatory nature of the death sentence immune from challenge.40 Having circumvented the potential obstacle posed by the partial savings clause, the Privy Council when on to hold that the requirement for mandatory imposition of the death sentence in the St. Lucia criminal code was inconsistent with the prohibition on inhuman treatment and punishment in the St Lucia constitution. As such, St Lucia’s Criminal Code was then modified by Privy Council to provide a regime of individualized sentencing, as is done for offenses other than murder in St. Lucia.41
On the other hand, the Privy Counsel also found that while a mandatory death sentence was cruel and unusual punishment, it was immunized by the constitution’s general savings clause and was subject to removal only by the Parliament.42 This was held in Rodal v. Trinidad and Tobago, a case from Trinidad and Tobago that was before the Privy Counsel. Cases from Trinidad and Tobago concerning the application of the general savings clause presumably preclude all challenges to the legality of all pre-independence laws on any constitutional grounds.43 This result is also present in other Commonwealth Caribbean countries. St. Kitts and Nevis contained partial savings clause as a means of immunizing from constitutional challenge any law authorizing the infliction of any law authorizing the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful prior to independence.44 Such clauses are also found in the constitutions of Jamaica and the Bahamas. 45
As a result of the Privy Counsel leaving a path of a confusing body of law that undermines the fundamental integrity of constitutionalism, local courts are in inhibited from giving fundamental rights their full scope “retarding the goal of individual rights.”46 Commonwealth constitutional courts have found themselves inhibited by the savings clause. In 1995, the Botswana Court of Appeal rejected a constitutional challenge to a sentence of death by hanging. 47 The court ruled that a savings clause insulated the method of penalty from challenge under the inhuman or degrading punishment clause. 48Nevertheless, observing that international law was headed in the direction of abolition, the court stated its "hope that ... [legislature will consider changes] necessary to further establish the claim of this country as one of the great liberal democracies of the world."49
While the Privy Counsel has made many liberal constitutional interpretations in hopes to cement that constitutions are to be given purposive and generous interpretations, the interpretation of the constitutions through the use of saving law or existing law clauses are limiting the construction. Nonetheless, what should always remain in the minds of the jurists is the basic underlying premise that constitutions are living instruments. As such, the constitution should be not be interpreted in such a stagnant, non purposive manner.
How Savings Clauses have Undermined the Force of Constitutions
“The savings clause takes back with one hand what the fundamental rights provisions are meant to give with another, rendering ordinary laws more sacrosanct than the constitution to which they should be subordinated. The clause requires constitutional jurists to ignore the very constitutional protections they are charged with enforcing.”50 The threshold question then becomes: have these savings clauses undermined the creative force of Caribbean constitutions?
The balance between the human rights provisions provided by the Caribbean constitutions in their Bill of Rights and the existing common law expressly saved demonstrate how savings clauses have undercut constitutionalism. Specific cases, including recent death penalty cases, from various Commonwealth Caribbean nations portrays the manipulated power of savings clauses.
Generally in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions are generally considered the supreme law and ultimate source of power, the predicament between theory and reality are prevalent when looking at the Bill of Rights Clauses. In Collymore v. AG, the Privy Counsel held that the constitutional provision that protected trade union rights did not include the right to strike. 51 The trade union rights only provided for the rights to form and join a trade union and freedom of assembly.52 The court found that the right to strike was not included on the basis that at common law there was no such right to strike. 53
The conflict between the Bill of Rights and opposing common law expressly saved was also prevalent in two cases from Jamaica, Nasralla v. DPP and Robinson v. R.. In Nasralla v. DPP, the Privy Counsel declared fundamental rights which were enshrined in the new Jamaican Constitution were already secured to the people of Jamaica.54 Hence, the court found that the rights and freedoms as declared under the new written Constitution were subject to the ‘existing law’ or saved common law when they interpreted the Jamaican savings clause. 55 “The implication here was that the constitutional rights protected were only those which existed before the advent of the written Constitution” 56 Additionally, Robinson v. R. was an opinion from Jamaica emanating from the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 57 In this case, Robinson lost his case right up to the level of the Privy Counsel. 58 The case involved an argument that his right to a fair was violated when his murder trial was forced to proceed without an attorney. 59 The UN of Human rights Committee, in rejecting a restrictive view of the Constitution, found that this was a violation of his right to a fair hearing, although the common law position is that there is no right to legal counsel. 60 Although the case did not specifically refer to a saving law clause, the underlying issue, that is, the creation of new constitutional rights, not hitherto contained under the common law was addressed. 61
The most recent and perhaps most starkest example of the serious harm savings clauses do to Caribbean constitutional jurisprudence is evidenced in Griffith and Ors. v. The Queen.62 In this case a group of men and youths were convicted of murder when a robbery went awry. 63 The adult defendants, who received the sentence of death, appealed from a decision of the Barbados Court of Appeal, seeking to set aside their convictions and sentences on the grounds that there was no determination of malicious intent on the felony murder charge, and no consideration of mitigating factors or of individual culpability for the death penalty under the mandatory murder statute. 64 The Griffith court found itself bound by the precedent cases of Boyce v. The Queen and Khan v. The State. 65 The Griffith defendants argued that even if the mandatory sentence was a saved law under Boyce, and the felony murder rule not unconstitutional under Khan, the combined effect of the two rules deprived them of the individualized treatment that fundamental fairness required. The court disagreed and affirmed the ruling of the Barbados Court of Appeal.66 Here two criminal law rules, which were abandoned as unfair in other jurisdictions, were combined to eliminate the opportunity to individualize the treatment of criminal defendants, exposing them to the most severe penalty in a prosecutor's arsenal. 67 The expectation in a murder case is that the defendant's motive will be, at some point in the proceedings--either during the trial on the merits, or at sentencing, or at both points--scrutinized.68 The upshot of Griffith is that intent is rendered irrelevant to both conviction and sentence. 69 Under the rule of the case, an accused could be sent to the gallows without any consideration of mens rea, the fundamental premise in criminal law.70
However, not all countries that have savings clauses in their constitutions react this way. In Guyana, Article 141 of the Constitution contains a specific savings clause that authorizes punishments existing at the entry into force of the Constitution.71 While this operates to save the death penalty, the implementation of the penalty is an entirely different matter and Guyanese jurisprudence diverges significantly from that of its Commonwealth Caribbean neighbours. 72Although the interpretation of Article 141 is, to an extent, settled law in Guyana, the executive has been clearly reluctant to enforce capital punishment. 73 Nevertheless this creates another problem. In the interim, dozens of convicted men who have exhausted their appeals remain trapped in a prison cell awaiting execution.74
While the framers were seeking to preserve a legal order thought to be efficient and effective, and one that was familiar, they weighed down future jurists with yesterday's laws. As a result, they have prevented them from engaging in righteous interpretation, which is the fundamental premise of constitutionalism. 75 What has mainly resulted is a hindrance in the application of human rights provisions. As a leading scholar in Caribbean Constitutions, Margaret Burnham, stated on the savings clause: “[t]he clauses eliminates the plasticity, organicity, and elasticity that fundamental rights adjudication requires to respond effectively, as it must, both to evolving universal standards and to culturally specific normative shifts. In sum, it violates the time honoured rule, cogently expressed by Alexander Hamilton that constitutional framers must ‘look forward to remote futurity.’”76
Addressing the Problem of Savings Clauses
Savings clauses in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions appear to present an insurmountable obstacle to genuine constitutional process, and therefore, its elimination should be considered. The Privy Counsel has made many liberal constitutional interpretations when deciding cases. Nevertheless, the Privy Counsel’s death penalty jurisprudence has been shackled by savings clauses. As a result, the Privy Counsel is put in the impossible situation of enabling the Caribbean states to impose a death penalty that the Privy Counsel’s Judicial Committee considers in violation of the customary norms.77 It will be extremely important for the region’s new court, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), to clarify this area of the law.
Initially, in the 1990s, appellate courts, seeking to avoid such anachronism and to construe the fundamental rights provisions of the Caribbean constitutions, showed some flexibility in interpreting the savings clause.78 Looking to the broad purpose of the fundamental rights provisions, the Privy Council increasingly sought to avoid the “juggernaut” created by the savings clause, as indeed was required lest these constitutions be stripped of any meaningful human rights content. 79But in its attempts to reconcile the old pre-independence-saved laws with current human rights norms, the Privy Council came under criticism, from within and beyond the legal community, for exceeding its proper function.80 Critics asserted that in ignoring the clear meaning and intent of the savings clause, the Privy Council was manipulating and degrading Caribbean constitutional jurisprudence to the results that it wanted to achieve.81
The Privy Council initially attempted to temper such criticism by situating its conclusions squarely within the norms of international law particularly in the death penalty cases, and by narrowly construing the savings clause. 82 The Privy Counsel was in a unique position of being neither a local nor a foreign court; therefore it was entirely appropriate for it to situate its constitutional decisions in the context of foreign and international law. However, such methods of constitutional interpretation provoked criticism from those urging that an old imperial court should not oversee the constitutions of independent states.83 Critics stated that “such a relationship all the more demeans the values of independence and sovereignty when the imperial court deploys interpretive license to elide troublesome constitutional barriers and to recast the text so that it always mirrors the shifting ethos of the former imperial power.”84
On the other side of the coin, the support of Commonwealth Caribbean governments for capital punishment, and their disdain for the judgments of the Privy Council, has hindered the ability of that tribunal to develop a cohesive jurisprudence that fully respects international law for the Commonwealth as a whole. 85 When the Privy Council sustained, for any reason, a Caribbean death sentence, it did so in the face of the increasingly global consensus that the sentence is incompatible with human rights.86 Hence, the Privy Council had found itself under pressure from two competing communities – the Commonwealth Caribbean nations on the one hand and the international human rights community on the other. 87
Obviously, this uncomfortable dissonance is unlikely to disappear automatically with the recent launch of the CCJ. Similar to the Privy Council, the CCJ, too, is an international tribunal construing municipal constitutional law, and it will need to reconcile conflicting constitutional law and international human rights norms. The CCJ will especially need to reconcile given the role international law will play on the court's original jurisdiction side.88 One might hope that the autonomous constitutional system, uninfluenced by international law, may be a thing of the past.89 “Given the complementary nature of the state and federal organs at play in CARICOM and subject to the jurisdiction of the CCJ, it will be impossible to maintain a hermetic seal on the municipal side.” 90 It would be unreasonable for the CCJ to be entirely international when dealing with trade law, while at the same time is purely domestic when coping with human rights. 91
Conclusion: Moving Forward in the Face of Savings Clauses
Savings clauses were designed to ensure continuity from the colonial to the post independent legal era. Instead, what resulted was the perception that Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions merely codified existing rights and did not create new ones; which then hindered the rights provided by human rights provisions.
It is absolutely necessary that there be change in this area of the Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional law. “Constitutionalism cannot survive so long as the multiple iterations of the savings clause preempt, in radically different ways, basic rights. What is left is a constitution without constitutionalism, an instrument with no true normative message or predictive value.” 92
A simple solution to the savings clause problem could be ameliorated by law reform initiatives to modernize Commonwealth Caribbean statute law. 93 Legislative and judicial attention could address the mischief that the savings clause continues to create in Caribbean constitutional law. 94 Commentators have been urging constitutional amendments to eliminate the clauses. 95 However, the legislative resources necessary for such a change have not been adequately mobilized to affect such a change. 96 Especially in light of the fact that some Caribbean nations still use the labor laws received from England during the colonial period. 97
Therefore, the Caribbean Court of Justice will need to bring some order to this area of constitutional law. As discussed earlier, the Privy Counsel attempted to bring some order but generally failed. It was difficult for the Privy Counsel to act because it seemed that the Privy Counsel was trying to further the values of its own culture rather than that of the international community. This was the prevalent view because of the distance of the Privy Counsel from the Commonwealth Caribbean, as well as the fact that it was the former imperial power. On the other hand, while the CCJ will be facing these problems it will not be judged as harshly as the Privy Counsel, because of its inherent rapport of being a local Court of Appeal.
Caribbean societies are being shaped by an internationalist, and an even more metropolitan, point of view of what is right and appropriate for Caribbean peoples. 98 Caribbean societies can be influenced because they are not completely in control of their own political and economic destinies, and far less their legal destinies. 99 This is not necessarily a bad thing, as the Commonwealth Caribbean region, as elsewhere, subscribes to the view that there should be basic standards of decency which all nations should share. Yet, locating the threshold for these standards can sometimes produce jurisprudential tensions. 100 This is particularly the case where the constitution is silent or unclear on a particular matter.”101 As such it will be up to the CCJ to merge the prevailing trends in human rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
The CCJ is a welcomed revolutionary from the Privy Counsel in hopes that a locally based final Court of Appeal will be more accepting of the Caribbean culture, values and norms. As such, the CCJ will need to strike a balance between the customs of the international community, the municipal law and the collective social culture of the Caribbean people. “Constitutional jurisprudence and reform can be influenced.” 102 It can be influenced by not only the internal, domestic, society but also by the external, international, society. The change will only be accepted because it is coming from a local source, the CCJ. The CCJ will need to ensure the Caribbean peoples that while the CCJ is striking a balance between the competing views (of the Caribbean society and the international society) that the CCJ will hold the values of the Caribbean society at the highest priority when making its determinations. Only then is it likely that the curse of the savings clauses will be lifted.
1 Rose-Marie Bell Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 78, January 1999.
2 Johanna Harrington, The Challenge to the Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 126, 128 (2004).
3 Margaret A. Burnham, Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: the Saving’s Clause in the Law of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 36 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 249, 251 (2005).
4 See Id.
5 See Id.
6 Burnham, supra note 3, at 250.
7 See Id. See also Trin. & Tobago Const. ch. I, pt. II §6.
8 Burnham, supra note 3, at 250. See also Mathew v. State, (2004) U.K.P.C. 33 (appeal taken from Trinidad and Tobago).
9 Burnham, supra note 3, at 250.
10 See Id. .
11 Antoine, supra note 1, at 78.
12 Margaret A. Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and the Death Penalty: The Case of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 Int’l J. Const. L 582, 605 (2005).
13 Burnham, supra note 12, at 584.
14 Burnham, supra note 12, at 605.
15 Rose-Marie Antoine, Waiting to Exhale: Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems, 29 Nova L. Rev. 141, 154 (2005).
16 Burnham, supra note 3, at 249.
17 Burnham, supra note 12, at 584.
18 See Id.
19 See Id.
20 Harrington at 131.
21 Burnham, supra note 3, at 249.
22 See Id.
23 Antoine, supra note 1, at 78.
24 Burnham, supra note 3, at 251.
25 See Id.
26 See Id. at 241 – 252.
27 See Id.
28 See Id. at 269. See also Jones v. Att’y Gen., (1995) 1 W.L.R. 891.
29 Burnham, supra note 3, at 251.
30 See Id.
31 See Id.
32 Burnham, supra note 12, at 610.
33 See Id.
34 See Id.
35 Burnham, supra note 12, at 610.
36 See Id.
37 See Id. at 605.
38 Harrington at 134. See also. Pinder v. The Queen,  U.K.P.C. 46.
39 Harrington at 134. See also St. Lucia Const. para. 10.
40 Harrington at 134.
41 Harrington at 134. See also Rodal v. Trinidad and Tobago, C.R.A. No. 64 of 99, July 17, 2002.
42 Harrington at 136.
43 See Id.
44 See Id. at 134 – 135.
45 See Id. .
46 Burnham, supra note 12, at 607.
47 Burnham, supra note 12, at 609. See also State v Ntesang,  (4) BCLR 426. (Bostwana).
48 Burnham, supra note 12, at 609.
49 See Id.
50 Burnham, supra note 3, at 251.
51 Antoine, supra note 1, at 78. See also Collymore v. AG, (1967) 12 WIR 5.
52 See Id.
53 See Id.
54 Antoine, supra note 1, at 78. See also Nasralla v. DPP, (1967) 2 AC 238, PC.
55 See Id.
56 See Id.
57 Antoine, supra note 1, at 78. See also Robinson v. R, U.N.H.R.C. Communication No 223/1987, decided 1989.
58 See Id.
59 See Id.
60 See Id.
61 See Id.
62 Burnham, supra note 12, at 611. See also Griffith and Ors. v. The Queen,  3 W.L.R. 786 (P.C.) (appeal from Barbados).
63 See Id.
64 See Id.
65 See Id.
66 See Id.
67 See Id.
68 See Id.
69 See Id.
70 See Id.
71 Arif Bulkan, Democracy in Disguise: Assessing the Reforms to the Fundamental Rights Provisions in Guyana, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 613, 637 (2004).
72 See Id.
73 See Id.
74 See Id.
75 Burnham, supra note 12, at 615.
76 See Id.
77 See Id. at 614.
78 See Id. at 608.
79 See Id.
80 David Simons, Conflicts between Law and Policy of the Caribbean: Human Rights and the Enforcement of the Death Penalty – Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 9 Trans’l L.& Policy 263 (2000).
81 Simons at 263.
82 Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rigths and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1863 (2003).
83 Hugh. A. Rawlins, The Caribbean Court of Justice: The History and Analysis of the Debate, 14-15 CARICOM. available at: www.caricom.org (last visited April 2006).
84 Burnham, supra note 12, at 608.
85 See Id. at 609.
86 See Id.
87 See Id.
88 Rheem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment: Trans-judicialisms and the Five Faces of International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 Geo Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 555, 556 (2002).
89 See Id.
90 See Id.
91 See Id.
92 Burnham, supra note 3, at 269. See also Jones v. Att’y Gen., (1995) 1 W.L.R. 891.
93 Burnham, supra note 3, at 252.
94 See Id.
95 See Id.
96 See Id.
97 See Id.
98 See Id.
99 See Id.
100 See Id.
101 Antoine, supra note 15, at 154 – 155.
102 See Id.